An Epidemiological Approach to the Spread of Political Third Parties by Romero, Daniel M. et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
91
1.
23
88
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  1
2 N
ov
 20
09
An Epidemiological Approach to the
Spread of Political Third Parties
Daniel M. Romero1, Christopher M. Kribs-Zaleta2∗,
Anuj Mubayi2, Clara Orbe3
1 Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
2 Department of Mathematics, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX
3 Department of Applied Physics and Applied Mathematics, Columbia University, New York, NY
October 29, 2018
* Corresponding author, e-mail: kribs@uta.edu
Mailing address: UTA Mathematics Department, Box 19408, Arlington, TX 76019-0408
Tel: +1 (817)272-5513, fax: +1 (817)272-5802
NOTE: E-mail is the preferred contact as Dr. Kribs-Zaleta will be working at the Uni-
versite´ de Lyon 1 in France during the 2009–2010 academic year. The telephone and fax
numbers in Lyon are not yet available.
1
Abstract
Third political parties are influential in shaping American politics. In this work we
study the spread of a third party ideology in a voting population where we assume that
party members/activists are more influential in recruiting new third party voters than
non-member third party voters. The study uses an epidemiological metaphor to develop
a theoretical model with nonlinear ordinary differential equations as applied to a case
study, the Green Party. Considering long-term behavior, we identify three threshold
parameters in our model that describe the different possible scenarios for the political
party and its spread. We also apply the model to the study of the Green Party’s growth
using voting and registration data in six states and the District of Columbia to identify
and explain trends over the past decade. Our system produces a backward bifurcation
that helps identify conditions under which a sufficiently dedicated activist core can
enable a third party to thrive, under conditions which would not normally allow it
to arise. Our results explain the critical role activists play in sustaining grassroots
movements under adverse conditions.
MSC primary 37N99, 91F10; secondary 91D30
Keywords grassroots, third parties, dynamical systems, backward bifurcation, threshold
behavior
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1 Introduction
The 2000 United States presidential election was for many a testimony to the impact of third
parties in a traditionally bipartisan government. Ralph Nader, the presidential candidate for
the Green Party, won 2% of the popular vote, a percentage that many attribute to the defeat
of Democratic candidate Al Gore (Southwell, 2004). The Green Party captured a seemingly
insignificant number of votes relative to majority percentages, yet its presence in the election
ultimately served to shape American politics for the years following. This incident demon-
strates how third parties, often emerging as grassroots movements (i.e., movements at the
local level rather than at the center of major political activity), can ultimately impact at
the national level, hence prompting the need to study their emergence and spread within a
voting population.
Third parties are defined as political parties operating along with two major parties
in a bipartisan system over a limited period of time (where we define a limited period of
time as a range of a few years). For the purposes of this paper we apply this definition
to all minor parties. Traditionally, third parties have served as venues of political dissent
for voting individuals dissatisfied with the major candidates in an election. They often
tackle specific issues otherwise ignored by major political parties, thus relinquishing popular
support nationwide. As Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren wrote in 1957, “History has
amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups, which innumerable
times have been in the vanguard of democratic thought and whose programs were ultimately
accepted” (Warren, 1957). Hence, while third parties rarely capture the majority vote, their
agendas, often incorporated into major party platforms, are significant nonetheless.
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Given the potential relevance of third parties to national politics, we study, qualitatively
and numerically, the dynamics of the emergence and spread of third parties on a local level
where growth is measured in terms of the number of third party voters and members. We
restrict our study to a local level because third parties usually originate in a small group and,
via a “bottom-up” method of diffusion, spread within a population by acquiring local official
positions and then expanding to higher levels of government (Kowalewski, 1995). Although
individual personalities and circumstances dominate the initial formation of any group, the
ability of even a small group of people to make itself heard within a larger community is
great enough, especially in an age of information technology, that we consider the local level
large enough to be described by a collective average. That is, the voting population under
study is large enough that stochastic (random) effects are dominated by the deterministic
average behavior of the group.
We use an epidemiological paradigm (Brauer and Castillo-Cha´vez, 2001) to translate
third party emergence from a political phenomenon to a mathematical one where we assume
that third parties grow in a similar manner as epidemics in a population. We take this
approach following in the steps of previous theoretical studies that model social issues via
such methods (Bettencourt et al., 2006; Castillo-Cha´vez and Song, 2003; Crisosto et al.,
2001; Gonza´lez et al., 2003; Song et al., 2006). The epidemiological metaphor is suggested
by the assumption that individuals’ decisions are influenced by the collective peer pressure
generated by others’ behavior; the “contacts” between these two groups’ ideas are analogous
to the contact processes that drive the spread of infectious diseases. Here we assume that
a certain subpopulation of the voting individuals, defined according to certain demographic
factors, is more receptive (in epidemiological terms, susceptible) to third party ideology than
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the rest of the voting population, and that their political behavior is therefore driven by such
collective peer-pressure contacts (Southwell, 2003; Timpone, 1998; Wong, 2000).
There are many components that may affect the decision of a person when it comes to
voting. During a political campaign all candidates spend a great amount of effort to assure
that as many people as possible get exposed to their ideas, and most importantly, their
name. People are often so overwhelmed by exposure to different candidates that they end up
depending more on informal ways of obtaining information such as talking to other people.
This makes networking among people very influential during election time; in fact some
studies show that voting is “contagious” (Nickerson, 2008). It has been shown that people
often rely on friends, relatives, coworkers, etc. to obtain information about the candidates
(Robinson, 1976). Also, there is evidence that people who support a particular candidate
tend to encourage others to vote for that candidate (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). This
makes the interaction between people a very important factor in the voting process because
both the person wanting information seeks it from other people and the ones with particular
preferences want to share them.
Collective behaviors such as voting have been studied for decades, notably in the seminal
work of Granovetter (1978), who considered individuals in a population to have a distribution
of thresholds with regard to their willingness to participate in a particular collective behavior
(he used rioting as a primary example). Other subsequent studies considered the role played
by a core group of especially influential individuals (Macy, 1991; Oliver and Marwell, 1988),
such as party activists recruiting voters. These studies used probabilistic and stochastic
models which yielded primarily numerical results; in applying the epidemiological framework
described above, we focus on the collective (rather than individual) thresholds for persistence
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of a behavior (here voting and party membership) which our deterministic models allow us
to calculate.
While our model is designed to pertain to all third parties, we consider the Green Party
as a case study. Although formally united under the Association of State Green Parties in
1996 (and later the nationalized Green Party of the United States in 2001), state-based green
parties have thrived in the U.S. at the local level since 1984, when the Green Committees
of Correspondence (CoC) were formed with the purpose of organizing local Green groups
and working toward the founding of a national Green political party (Marks, 1997). Our
particular study focuses on the growth (and in some cases decline) of the Green Party in six
states and the District of Columbia in the past decade, using voting and registration data.
In comparing the predictions of our model to particular data, we consider a short time frame
so that we can assume that social structure within the state in question does not change
drastically, a necessary condition for assuming voting population heterogeneity.
We organize our paper as follows: Section 2 describes our theoretical model, as well as a
simplification in which the entire population under study is equally receptive to third party
ideas. Section 3 presents the mathematical analysis of the simplified model (which employs
qualitative analysis techniques from the field of nonlinear dynamical systems, as well as
sensitivity analysis) and interprets the results, and Section 4 applies them to a case study,
using data to estimate model parameters. Section 5 performs a similar but more limited
analysis of the more complex model, and Section 6 draws conclusions about the implications
of our models for the growth of third parties from grassroots movements.
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2 A Population Model for the Spread of a Third Party
2.1 Underlying Assumptions
In developing our model, we apply epidemiological terminology to describe the growth of
a third party. The assumptions we make about how individuals behave, and change their
behavior, define the classes in our compartmental model and the rates at which individuals
move between classes.
(1) We assume that our population is a heterogeneous mix of individuals who belong to
different backgrounds according to certain demographic factors.
Our model considers a population of all voters, N , divided into two classes or sub-
populations whose susceptibility to third party ideology is based on demographic factors such
as education, socioeconomic status, race, gender, age, political orientation and professional
occupation. Inherently, certain demographic characteristics, labelled as high affinity, make an
individual more likely to subscribe to a third party’s ideology, which targets a more specific
audience than alternative majority agendas. That is, upon entering the voting system,
certain individuals are more statistically inclined to vote a certain way. For example, a
progressive environmental activist is statistically more likely to agree and vote for the Green
Party agenda, which stresses communal-based economics, local government, and gender and
racial equity, than a conservative corporate executive whose economic philosophy directly
conflicts with that of the Green Party. For this reason we consider population heterogeneity
vital to this study.
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We apply the following method of dividing the entering voting population into two sus-
ceptible classes: if an individual has more high affinity factors than low affinity factors then
that person directly enters the high affinity class and similarly for low affinity susceptibles.
We define high affinity factors as features of the individual based on his/her demographic
profile that make him/her more inclined to vote for the third party; conversely, low affinity
factors make the individual less statistically likely to subscribe to the party’s platform. We
assume that a constant proportion p (0 < p < 1) of new voters enters the high-affinity class
H (the remaining 1− p proportion enter L).
(2) We assume that individuals’ affinity factors (demographic characteristics) remain fixed
for the period of the study.
(3) We assume that a third party’s agenda remains consistent over time.
We assume that individuals do not move from one susceptibility class to the other. One
reason for this is the relative permanence of individuals’ demographic characteristics. We
limit our model to tracing the expansion of the third party; hence, we refer to a shorter time
period over which we assume social structure remains constant. In other words, individuals
with high affinity to the third party do not become individuals with low affinity, and vice
versa.
The other reason for this consistency has to do with the parties themselves. In addition
to being more specific than major party agendas (i.e., more specific in their goals and less
geared to moderacy), third party platforms tend to be more consistent over time. Third
parties are not pressured to constantly adjust to the shifting demands of the populace since
they do not seek the majority vote. Consequently, they do not target the majority voting
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population. Each party has its own agenda, which appeals to certain sectors of the voting
population. Hence different parties target voting populations that are more inclined to sub-
scribe to their ideology. While one party, for example, may target individuals from a certain
educational background that we, in our model, label as high affinity and that other parties
may overlook, all parties nonetheless recognize that education factors into an individual’s
likelihood to support or refute that party’s platform. It is true that individuals from varied
backgrounds comprise the main parties, yet, when dealing with the specific agendas of third
parties that do not strive to sway the majority vote, we assume that third parties appeal to
individuals of certain demographic backgrounds more than others. Therefore, we account for
the aforementioned standard set of demographic factors that parties look at when spreading
their ideologies. In our paper we apply our model to an individual case study of the Green
Party of Pennsylvania; however, the same methodology of distinguishing susceptibles can be
applied to all third parties.
(4) We define two levels of participation in third-party politics: voting for third-party
candidates, and membership. A party exists only if it has members; we define members
as those who pay dues, volunteer, and preside over party affairs.
As described above, all voters enter the voting system either to the low affinity, L, or
high affinity, H , susceptible class. According to our epidemiological metaphor, in addition to
these two susceptible classes, our model includes three infected classes: VH , VL, andM , third
party voters from the high affinity class, third party voters from the low affinity class, and
party members respectively. We define party members as voters of the third party who pay
dues to the party; often such members officiate, volunteer and actively campaign for voter
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recruitment. In epidemiological terms, VH and VL correspond to voters of a lower degree of
infection and individuals of theM class are voters infected to a higher degree. We distinguish
between VH and VL because of their interactions with their respective “neighbors” in H and
L.
(5) We assume that third parties, emerging through resource-limited grassroots efforts,
spread primarily via primary (direct) contacts between third-party supporters and
susceptibles.
(6) We assume that third party members have a greater effect upon voter recruitment than
do third party voters, due to members’ activism.
In our model, a system of nonlinear differential equations, we consider susceptible move-
ment into voting and member compartments as well as possible regressions back from the
third party voting phase into the susceptible class. Once an individual is susceptible he/she
can become ‘infected’ (either VH or VL) through direct contact with the VH , VL, and M
classes. Due to a lack of funding and resulting lack of mass-media exposure to the gen-
eral population, these primary contacts with susceptibles involve such direct interaction as
personal meetings, phone conversations, and electronic communications like personally ad-
dressed e-mails and weblog (blog) comments. We assume that the rate at which these con-
tacts occur is proportional both to the size of the susceptible group and to the proportion
of third-party supporters in the population.
We do not consider a linear term weighing the influence of media coverage from the third
party (i.e., secondary contact factors) in the forward transition from both susceptible classes
to third party voting classes. Instead, we focus on the nonlinear terms considering the effects
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of voters from the VH , VL, and M classes, where voters from VH and VL bear an affinity-
specific influence βH (from H to VH) and βL (from L to VL) in third party voter recruitment.
Through activism, members fromM influence susceptibles of each type at higher rates (αβH
and αβL, respectively) than voters, with their increased influence measured by the parameter
α (α > 1).
(7) We consider both primary (direct) contacts and secondary (indirect) contacts in the
regression of third party voters to the susceptible class.
(8) We assume that all other parties exert equal influence in discouraging third party
voting.
(9) We assume that individuals have more influence upon others of their same affinity
class (high or low) than upon members of the other affinity class, in encouraging and
discouraging third party voting.
We consider the transitions back from the third party voting to the susceptible classes to
involve both linear terms, ǫHVH and ǫLVL, and nonlinear terms, φH(H + σL)
VH
N
and φL(L+
σH)VL
N
, contributions by secondary contacts with the opposition (i.e., media from well-funded
majority voters) and direct contact with the susceptible classes respectively. Compared to
primary contacts, described in a previous paragraph, secondary contacts include mass e-
mails, media, and circulating literature.
Voters from a certain susceptibility class (with its own set of demographic factors) address
issues that usually appeal more to voters deriving from the same class. Therefore, susceptible
individuals with high affinity bear a greater influence in recruiting voters who came from
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the high affinity susceptible class back into the susceptible class than susceptible individuals
with low affinity. The reduction in influence by individuals from a different affinity class is
denoted by σ, so that in regressing back from VH to H , σL represents the lesser influence that
L individuals exert on voters from VH than do susceptibles from H , the higher affinity class
(similar reasoning applies to the VL-to-L transition). Likewise, the cross-affinity influence in
recruiting third party voters is reduced by a factor of σ.
(10) We assume that third party voters become active party members through the ongoing
efforts (primary contacts) of the members, who have made a permanent commitment
to the party.
Once voting for the third party, individuals can become party members. They enter this
higher state of infection via the nonlinear terms γVH
M
N
and γVL
M
N
, where we only consider
the influence of primary contacts with party members in bringing about this transition,
measured by the rate parameter γ. Given that we are studying the spread of the party,
we assume that party members do not resign their memberships. We reason that once an
individual feels strongly enough to join a party, he/she retains his/her loyalty to the party;
the only way a person stops being a member (during the growth period under study) is by
leaving the voting system.
Finally, we consider natural exits from all classes as a result of death or moving. The sum
of the equations of the model, for both versions developed below, gives dN
dt
= 0, verifying that
our population stays constant, a safe assumption by which the number of people entering the
voting system (i.e., coming of age, moving in) counterbalances the number of people leaving
the system (i.e., dying, moving out).
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2.2 The General (Two-Track) Model
✲
pµN
✲
(1− p)µN
H
❄
µ
L
❄
µ
✲
βH(VH + σVL + αM)/N
✛
ǫH + φH(H + σL)/N
✲
βL(σVH + VL + αM)/N
✛
ǫL + φL(L+ σH)/N
VH
❄
µ
VL
❄
µ
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
γM/N
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✯
γM/N
M
❄
µ
Figure 1: The two-track model, with per capita flow rates
We first introduce a two-track model, as described immediately above, to study the
dynamics between a heterogeneously mixed population of susceptible voters, third party
voters, and party members. We apply the following set of ordinary differential equations to
model voting dynamics, as illustrated in Figure 1.
dH
dt
= pµN + ǫHVH + φH(H + σL)
VH
N
− βH(VH + σVL + αM)H
N
− µH, (1)
dL
dt
= (1− p)µN + ǫLVL + φL(L+ σH)VL
N
− βL(σVH + VL + αM) L
N
− µL, (2)
dVH
dt
= βH(VH + σVL + αM)
H
N
− ǫHVH − φH(H + σL)VH
N
− γMVH
N
− µVH , (3)
dVL
dt
= βL(σVH + VL + αM)
L
N
− ǫLVL − φL(L+ σH)VL
N
− γMVL
N
− µVL, (4)
dM
dt
=
γMVH
N
+
γMVL
N
− µM, (5)
N = H + L+ VH + VL +M. (6)
Adding equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) yields dN
dt
= 0, showing that the total population
N is constant over time. Model parameters are summarized in Table 1.
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2.3 The Simplified (One-Track) Model
In order to facilitate analysis of the two-track model, we initially consider a simplified version
that does away with voting population heterogeneity (assumption (1), and consequently (9))
before exploring analysis for the more complex system. This simplified model assumes a
homogeneous susceptible population (p = 0 or p = 1), reducing the two-track model to one
susceptible class, S, and two infected classes: third party voters, V , and party members, M ,
respectively. The S class comprises those individuals who vote, but do not vote for the third
party. The V class comprises the third party voters, and the M class again has third party
members (i.e., party officials, donors, volunteers).
In the one-track model we omit unnecessary parameters from the heterogeneous version.
Figure 2 illustrates the one-track model, and Table 2 summarizes the parameters.
✲
µN
S
❄
µ
✲
β(V + αM)/N
✛
ǫ+ φS/N V
❄
µ
✲
γM/N
M
❄
µ
Figure 2: The one-track model, with per capita flow rates
In this case the model reduces to the following system, which is effectively two-dimensional
since N can again be seen to be constant:
dS
dt
= µN + ǫV + φS
V
N
− β(V + αM) S
N
− µS, (7)
dV
dt
= β(V + αM)
S
N
− ǫV − φS V
N
− γMV
N
− µV, (8)
dM
dt
=
γMV
N
− µM, (9)
N = S + V +M. (10)
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3 Analysis of the One-Track Model
We begin our analysis by calculating equilibria for our model and determining conditions
for their existence and stability. We first simplify the system in two ways. Since the total
voting population N is assumed constant, we can reduce our system to two dimensions by
rewriting S = N − V −M in equation (8), so that
dV
dt
= β(V + αM)
N − V −M
N
− ǫV − φ(N − V −M)V
N
− γMV
N
− µV. (11)
We can now analyze the system defined by (11) and (9), as S can always be found once V
and M are known.
The constancy of N also allows us to proportionalize the system by defining new variables
v = V
N
, m = M
N
, and s = S
N
= 1 − v − m, which give the proportion of the population in
each class. Dividing equations (11) and (9) by N and substituting the new variables gives,
finally, the system
dv
dt
= β(v + αm)(1− v −m)− ǫv − φ(1− v −m)v − γmv − µv, (12)
dm
dt
= (γv − µ)m. (13)
In order to analyze stability we linearize the system and compute partial first derivatives
with respect to each of the variables, v and m, obtaining the Jacobian matrix J1 for system
(12)–(13):
J1 =


(β − φ)(1− 2v −m)− (αβ + γ)m− (µ+ ǫ) αβ(1− v − 2m)− (β − φ+ γ)v
γm γv − µ


.
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3.1 E1: Party-Free Equilibrium (PFE)
The party-free equilibrium (PFE) for the reduced system occurs at (0,0), the steady state
achieved when the entire population resides in the S class (i.e., the third party has neither
voters nor members and, by definition of party existence, does not exist). The PFE is
essentially analogous to the disease-free equilibrium in epidemiology and always exists as a
possible outcome for the voting population.
Applying the above reduced Jacobian matrix to our PFE, (0,0), where we only consider
the v and m terms, we determine PFE stability:
J1(0, 0) =


(β − φ)− (µ+ ǫ) αβ
0 −µ


.
The equilibrium point (0,0) will be locally asymptotically stable (LAS) if all the eigenvalues
of the matrix are negative. Assuming µ > 0, the eigenvalue −µ of the Jacobian is always
negative, whereas the second eigenvalue (β − φ)− (µ + ǫ) < 0 if and only if (β−φ)
µ+ǫ
< 1. For
ease of notation and interpretation we define the threshold quantity R1 =
(β−φ)
µ+ǫ
, so that the
PFE is LAS if and only if R1 < 1. We discuss the relevance of this threshold value in the
last part of this section.
3.2 E2: Member-Free Equilibrium (MFE)
The member-free equilibrium (MFE) occurs whenM = 0 but V, S 6= 0, i.e., the voting popu-
lation subdivides between susceptibles, S, and third party voters, V . While mathematically
possible, this outcome is politically unrealistic given that voters cannot vote for a party
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that does not exist (recall our assumption (4) that party existence depends on the presence
of an M class). For mathematical consistency, however, we consider the equilibrium point
(v∗2,m
∗
2), where m
∗
2 = 0. (Note that the asterisk superscript denotes equilibrium values, while
the numerical subscript distinguishes the equilibrium point in question.) This arises from
the equilibrium condition obtained by setting dm/dt = 0 in (13):
(γv∗ − µ)m∗ = 0, (14)
which implies that either (γv∗ − µ) = 0 (which we will consider later) or m∗ = 0.
To find v∗2 we set dv/dt = 0 and m
∗ = 0 in (12) and rearrange terms to get
(β − φ)v∗2 + (µ+ ǫ+ φ− β)v∗ = 0.
This implies that either v∗ = 0 (the party-free equilibrium) or (β − φ)v∗ = β − (µ+ ǫ+ φ).
We consider the situation where v∗ 6= 0, solve for v∗ and simplify the results as follows:
v∗2 = 1−
µ+ ǫ
β − φ = 1−
1
R1
where v∗2 retains political value only if R1 > 1—otherwise v
∗
2 < 0 which is meaningless.
Finally, we can also write s∗2 = 1 − v∗2 −m∗2 = µ+ǫβ−φ = 1R1 , which makes sense politically
only if R1 > 1 (i.e, s
∗
2 < 1). We can therefore express our member-free equilibrium as
E2 = (1 − 1R1 , 0). The MFE exists if and only if R1 > 1, since ignoring this condition leads
to a negative third party voting population.
The above situation makes mathematical sense but not political sense since parties, by
our original assumption, do not exist without members, and in this member-free case we deal
with voters who vote for a non-existent party. We might interpret this situation as having
voters still willing to vote for this party, but no party candidates for whom to vote.
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Regardless of the political likelihood of MFE existence, we consider its stability. Again,
we apply the method of using the reduced system’s Jacobian matrix in determining the
stability of the member-free equilibrium:
J1(1− 1R1 , 0) =


(µ+ ǫ)(1− R1) αβ( 1R1 )− (β − φ+ γ)(1− 1R1 )
0 γ(1− 1
R1
)− µ


.
The reduced system equilibrium point (1 − 1
R1
, 0) is locally asymptotically stable if all the
eigenvalues of the above matrix are negative. We know that, since R1 > 1 (in order for the
MFE to exist), one of the eigenvalues, (µ+ ǫ)(1−R1), is negative. The second eigenvalue of
the Jacobian is γ(1− 1
R1
)− µ. This eigenvalue is negative if and only if γ
µ
(1− 1
R1
) < 1.
We define the left hand side of the inequality as R2 =
γ
µ
(1 − µ+ǫ
β−φ
) = γ
µ
(1 − 1
R1
). Hence
we have derived two threshold parameters R1 and R2 that determine equilibria stability
depending on relative parameter values. (Note that they are related: R1 = 1⇔ R2 = 0.)
3.3 E3 and E4: Survival Equilibria
In the event of survival equilibria, the voting population subdivides between susceptibles, S,
third party voters, V , and members, M . We regard this as a successful state of coexistence
and, given certain conditions, the point at which the party thrives. We determine the
equilibrium proportions by returning to the condition (14) that dm/dt = 0. Since dm
dt
=
(γv∗ − µ)m∗, v∗ = µ
γ
when m∗ 6= 0. Here we impose the condition µ < γ so that v∗ < 1,
since s∗ + v∗ +m∗ = 1.
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Next we set dv/dt = 0 and v∗ = µ
γ
in (12):
dv
dt
= (β − φ) µ
γ
(
1− µ
γ
−m∗
)
+ αβm∗
(
1− µ
γ
−m∗
)
− (µ+ ǫ+ γm∗) µ
γ
= 0.
This equation, which is quadratic in m∗, can be rewritten (after dividing through by −αβ)
in the form f(m∗) = m∗2 +BM∗ + C = 0, where
B =
(
β − φ
αβ
)
µ
γ
−
(
1− µ
γ
)
+
µ
αβ
, C = −µ
γ
[
β − φ
αβ
(
1− µ
γ
)
− µ+ ǫ
αβ
]
. (15)
Solutions to f(m∗) = 0 are given by the quadratic formula
m∗
±
=
1
2
[
−B ±
√
B2 − 4C
]
;
however, in general, these solutions may be real, or may fall outside the meaningful interval
(0, 1− v∗]. Depending on the values of model parameters, there may be 0, 1, or 2 solutions
within this interval, each corresponding to a meaningful equilibrium with positive party
membership.
Analysis of the conditions involved in determining the number of survival equilibria is
considerably more involved than that for E1 and E2; details are given in the Appendix. The
results, which introduce an additional threshold quantity, can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. (i) If R2 > 1, the system (12)–(13) has precisely one survival equilibrium
E3 = (
γ
µ
, m∗+).
(ii) If R2 < 1, then the system has two survival equilibria, E3 and E4 = (
γ
µ
, m∗
−
), if and
only if R3 > 1, where
R3 = min (R3a, R3b) , R3a = r3
(
1− 1 + q
r2
)
, R3b =
√
r3
(
1−
√
1− q
r2
+ h
)
, (16)
19
and
q =
β − φ
αβ
, r2 = γ/µ, r3 = αβ/µ, h =
2√
r3
(√
1 +
ǫ
γ
− 1
)
.
Otherwise there are none.
To interpret the conditions R3a > 1 and R3b > 1, we can rewrite them as follows:
B < 0⇔ R3a > 1⇔ 1
αβ
+
1 + q
γ
<
1
µ
, (17)
B2 − 4C ≥ 0⇔ R3b > 1⇔
√
1
αβ
+
√
1− q
γ
+ hˆ(ǫ/γ) ≤
√
1
µ
, (18)
where
hˆ(ǫ/γ) = 2
√
1
αβ
√
1
µ
(√
1 +
ǫ
γ
− 1
)
> 0.
Both inequalities (17) and (18) relate the minimum amounts of time taken for an indi-
vidual to be influenced by a party member (M) to move from S to V , 1/αβ, and from V to
M , 1/γ, to the average lifetime of an individual in the voting system, 1/µ. In order for the
party to survive, a weighted sum of the first two times must be less than the average lifetime
in the system, or else individuals in S will, on average, leave the system before they can
“replace” the members in M who recruited them. The weights in the sum involve q = β−φ
αβ
,
the relative effectiveness of voters V to members M in recruiting new voters from S, because
the influence of party voters reduces the recruiting threshold burden on party members M
to some extent.1 (Note that 0 < q < 1.)
Observe that (18) implies that
√
1
αβ
+
√
1− q
γ
≤
√
1
µ
. (19)
1 If we define T1 = 1/αβ, T2 = 1/γ, and T3 = 1/µ, (17) and (18) can be written more simply as
T1 + (1 + q)T2 < T3,
√
T1 +
√
(1− q)T2 + h ≤
√
T3.
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If ǫ << γ, we can generate a Maclaurin (Taylor) expansion in ǫ/γ for (18) which yields
√
1
αβ
+
√
1− q
γ
+
1
2
√
1
αβ
√
1
µ√
1−q
γ
(
ǫ
γ
)
+O
[(
ǫ
γ
)2]
≤
√
1
µ
.
This expansion suggests more quantitatively how the influence ǫ of voters for other parties S
in getting third-party voters V to “defect” back to the major parties complicates the third
party’s survival (which would otherwise only require (19)).
Having established conditions for the existence of the two survival equilibria, E3 and E4,
we examine their stability. The reduced Jacobian matrix for the survival equilibria follows:
J1(
µ
γ
, m∗
±
) =


[
(β − φ)
(
1− 2µ
γ
−m∗
±
) [
αβ
(
1− µ
γ
− 2m∗
±
)
−(αβ + γ)m∗
±
− (µ+ ǫ)] −(β − φ)µ
γ
− µ
]
γm∗
±
0


.
The stability (LAS) criterion that the eigenvalues of this matrix have negative real part is
equivalent to the conditions that the trace be negative and the determinant positive. We
calculate
det J1(
µ
γ
, m∗
±
) = −γm∗
±
[
αβ
(
1− µ
γ
− 2m∗
±
)
− (β − φ)µ
γ
− µ
]
,
so that
det J1(
µ
γ
, m∗
±
) > 0⇔
[
αβ
(
1− µ
γ
− 2m∗
±
)
− (β − φ)µ
γ
− µ
]
< 0
⇔ m∗
±
>
1
2
[(
1− µ
γ
)
−
(
β − φ
αβ
)
µ
γ
− µ
αβ
]
= −B
2
.
Since m∗
−
< −B
2
< m∗+, we see that E4 is never stable, while the stability condition for E3
reduces to trJ1(
µ
γ
, m∗+) < 0. Thus we calculate
tr J1(
µ
γ
, m∗+) = (β − φ)
(
1− 2µ
γ
)
− (µ+ ǫ)− (β − φ+ αβ + γ)m∗+,
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so that
tr J1(
µ
γ
, m∗+) < 0⇔ m∗+ >
(β − φ)
(
1− 2µ
γ
)
− (µ+ ǫ)
(β − φ+ αβ + γ) =
(β − φ) µ
γ
(R2 − 2)
(β − φ) + αβ + γ . (20)
This is true for all m∗ when R2 < 2. The case when R2 ≥ 2 requires further algebra and
is relegated to the Appendix. The result is that E3 is always stable (LAS) when it exists,
while E4 is always unstable.
3.4 Global Behavior
Table 3 summarizes the conditions for existence and local stability of the four equilibria of the
one-track model. Because system (7)–(9) can be reduced to a set of two differential equations
(12)–(13), we can apply the Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem to establish global stability. Since
the system is well-posed, with the invariant set D = {(v,m) : v,m > 0; v +m ≤ 1}, there
are no unbounded solutions beginning in the state space, and a straightforward application
of Dulac’s Criterion with the function b = 1/vm confirms that there are no limit cycles,
either:
∂
∂v
(
b
dv
dt
)
+
∂
∂m
(
b
dm
dt
)
< 0 in D.
Therefore, all solutions to the system which begin within the state space must approach
an equilibrium. In particular, when only one locally stable (LAS) equilibrium exists, that
equilibrium must in fact be globally stable (GAS).
The conditions in Table 3 can be graphed to show the different possible global behaviors
of the one-track model. Each condition corresponds to a curve dividing parameter space into
multiple regions, each of which represents a different global behavior (see Appendix A.1 for
the derivations). The five resulting regions are illustrated in Figure 3 and summarized in
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Table 4.
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Figure 3: Regions of equilibrium stability, with q, x, y as in Appendix A
I In region I, E1 is the only stable equilibrium; the party will always go extinct.
II In region II where R1 > 1, R2 < 1, and R3 < 1, E2, the member-free state, is the only
stable equilibrium.
III In region III where both R1 > 1 and R2 > 1, E3 is the only stable equilibrium; the
party will inevitably approach a survival state.
IV In region IV where R1 > 1, R2 < 1 and R3 > 1, E2 and E3 coexist as stable equilibria
although, if placed in a political context, E2 is not a realistic outcome for the party.
V In region V where R1 < 1, R2 < 1, and R3 > 1, E1 and E3 are both stable; depending
on the initial conditions the solution tends to one state or the other.
The coexistence of two locally stable equilibria (one representing party survival and the
other party extinction) in regions IV and V involves a phenomenon known in epidemic
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modeling as a backward bifurcation, in which the exchange of stability at a threshold value
(here, R2 = 1) reverses direction, creating a situation in which the unstable equilibrium E4
serves to split the state space into two basins of attraction for the two stable equilibria. In
these regions, the equilibrium approached depends upon initial conditions: in particular, a
large enough core of dedicated members M can sustain the party (toward E3). What is
unusual here is that the “backward” part of the bifurcation curve can extend back beyond
not only the bifurcation at R2 = 1 but also the bifurcation at R1 = 1 (where R2 = 0), as
illustrated in Figure 4. Whenever R1 < 1, R2 < 0, a condition that would normally lead to
the death of the party given local asymptotic stability of the PFE, there are still conditions
(R3 > 1) under which two survival equilibria exist, one of which is stable (E3). In other
words, the party can thrive in conditions under which it would normally die out, given that
we have the necessary parameters and sufficient initial number of M individuals.
The ideal conditions for the party, of course, are when R2 > 1 (region III), in which the
party survives regardless of initial conditions. (Note R2 > 1 implies R1 > 1.) The last part
of this section interprets all these mathematical thresholds in political terms.
3.5 Threshold Parameters R1, R2, and R3
Our system contains three local thresholds or tipping points where population outcomes,
measured as S, V , and M , depend on parameter values. By tipping point we refer to the
sociological term that describes the point at which a stable phenomenon turns into a crisis,
which, in a political context, corresponds to the extreme states of the party: death and
growth (Gladwell, 2000). In the context of our model, for example, the party cannot sustain
24
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0.5 1 1.5 2 R2
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
m*
Figure 4: Diagram illustrating a backward bifurcation that extends below R2 = 0 (R1 = 1),
using parameter values φ = 0.15, µ = 0.05, ǫ = 0.25, γ = 0.20 (all rates in yr−1), α = 1.25
grassroots growth until parameter conditions reach R1 = 1, after which point the third party
voting and member classes gain individuals. These threshold quantities correspond to similar
terms in demographic and epidemic models called reproductive numbers which measure the
average number of offspring or infections caused by a single group member during its lifetime.
In our political context it is more appropriate to interpret these reproductive numbers in
collective terms as regards the influence of party voters on the susceptible population. We
distinguish between the aforementioned thresholds, R1, R2, and R3, by analyzing them
qualitatively in a political context.
R1 denotes the average number of susceptibles influenced to vote for the party by a single
party voter in V , if dropped into a homogeneous population of susceptibles. The expression
R1 =
β−φ
µ+ǫ
gives the net peer pressure, β−φ, on susceptibles S by voters V , multiplied by the
average time, 1
µ+ǫ
, spent in the voting class V . As mentioned above, it is most appropriate
to interpret R1 as an average number per voter taking into account the collective influence
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of all the party voters. Note that we are assuming that the influence of party voters on
susceptibles β is stronger than the reverse influence φ of susceptibles to discourage party
voters, a necessary condition for party emergence, which guarantees that R1 > 0.
R2 measures instead the second stage of recruitment: how effective party members M
are in recruiting third party voters to become members once there are enough individuals
in V . The expression R2 =
γ
µ
(1− 1
R1
) gives the product of the rate at which party activists
M recruit voters from V into M , γ, the average political lifetime of a party member, 1
µ
,
and the proportion of the population N in V at the MFE, (1 − 1
R1
) (since only voters V
can be recruited directly into M). Similar to R1, R2 measures the average number of V
to M conversions per individual in the M class. If party voters are ineffective at influenc-
ing susceptibles to vote for the party and R1 < 1, then the value of R2 will be negative;
rather than interpreting this as a negative ability of party members to recruit voters into
activism, however, it should be seen as an indication that the pool of party voters available
for recruitment into party membership is not there, preventing normal party growth.
R3 measures the extent to which party membersM actively recruit susceptible individuals
S into the voting class V . This activism, which sidesteps the traditional hierarchical structure
of a party, is a key characteristic of growing grassroots movements, which often lack a political
environment favorable to their growth in the traditional way outlined above (R2 < 1).
Because of the two conditions required mathematically for party survival when R2 < 1, R3
is defined as the greater of two quantities, both of which involve party members’ abilities to
recruit voters, r2, and members, r3, over their political lifetimes, as well as the relative efficacy
of voter peer-pressure influence to members’ influence through activism on the susceptible,
q. The general form r3(1 − 1/r2) present in both components of R3 parallels the form of
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R2 = r2(1−1/R1), with members’ potential r2 for converting third-party voters into members
reducing the constraint on their ability r3 to produce those voters in the first place. Note
that r2 must be great enough in order for R3 even to be positive: that is, only if the members
can recruit other members well can their recruitment of voters sustain the party.
We now list possible outcomes involving these thresholds and their implications:
1. When R1 < 1 (regions I and V in Figure 3 and Table 4) the net influence of party
voters V upon susceptibles is weak enough that grassroots emergence of the party is
not possible. The hierarchical structure of party involvement precludes normal growth
of party membership M when party voters are unable to replenish their own ranks
(R1 < 1 implies R2 < 0). However, exceptionally, if the recruiting ability of party
members M is great enough (R3 > 1, region V), a sufficiently large dedicated core
can sustain the party through its own efforts, despite the relative inefficiency or lack
of influence of those merely voting for the party. This outcome illustrates the key role
activists play in party survival during periods of adversity.
2. When R1 > 1 each individual in V is converting, on average, more than one person in
S into V , thus allowing the voting class V to thrive. If, in addition, R2 < 1 (regions II
and IV), we have a situation in which party activists are then unable to recruit from
the voting class effectively enough to maintain the party core M (perhaps because the
voting class is too small). Normally this would lead to an outcome in which a group
disposed to vote for the party remains (in V ) but the party core itself dwindles away,
leading effectively to party extinction (with the ideologically closest main political
party perhaps adjusting a platform to capture these votes). However, as with the case
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when R1 < 1, a sufficiently large initial core can ensure the party’s survival when
the core is effective at influencing individuals to begin voting for the party (R3 > 1,
region IV).
3. The condition R2 > 1 explains the case where the party (V and M classes) grows
normally, by recruiting members from the S and V populations, respectively. Here
the party voters are influential enough in garnering new voters from S (R1 > 1) that
the party’s survival does not depend on party activists’ ability to recruit new voters
directly (i.e., R3 does not come into play). In epidemiological terms, this corresponds
to a successful invasion: conditions are so favorable for the development of the party
that it will become established even with a small initial group of members.
In general, the survival of the party is determined by the interplay among the three
recruitment processes involved in the model: from S to V by members of V , as measured
by R1; from V to M by members of M , as measured by r2 (R2 incorporates both of these
first two processes); and from S to V by members of M , as measured by r3 (R3 incorporates
all three processes). Party survival requires either that the first two processes be effective
enough (R1 > 1 and R2 > 1) for a small grassroots effort to take hold, or else that an
initial membership core be large enough, and the second and third processes effective enough
(R3 > 1), that direct recruitment by party activists can sustain its membership.
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4 A Case Study: The Green Party
4.1 Methods
As an application of the simplified one-track model analyzed in Section 3, we used Green
Party registration and voting records for six states (CA, ME, MD, NY, OR, PA) and the
District of Columbia (DC) to study the growth of the Green Party during the past decade
or so.
We began by establishing basic demographic information for the target (study) popu-
lation. A report from the Pew Research Center (2007) provided annual statistics on per-
centages of Americans identifying themselves as confirmed Democrats or Republicans, lean-
ing Democrat or Republican, or confirmed or leaning toward third parties, for the period
1987–2007. We took an average of these percentages during the period 2000–2007, during
which time approximately 25% of the voting population identified itself as leaning Democrat
or Republican, and an additional about 11% as confirmed or leaning toward third parties
(including the Green Party). We estimate our target population—those capable of being in-
fluenced to vote Green—as all of the former group, and about half of the latter group (since
the latter group also includes confirmed Greens). Thus we estimate that the target popula-
tion consists of about 25%+6%=31% of the total voting population of each state. For each
state, we averaged the voting population size over the time period of interest (which varied
slightly from state to state, as detailed below) from voting records. We then normalized the
voting and registration records as proportions of the target population in each case.
To determine the replacement (or mortality) rate µ, we used the average 2003 life ex-
pectancy at birth in the U.S. of 77.5 years given in Shrestha (2006), and the minimum
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voting age of 18 years, to derive an average voting lifetime of 59.5 years, for an estimate of
µ = 1/59.5 yr ≈ 4.58 × 10−5/day. (A United Nations (2008) report gives an average U.S.
life expectancy at birth of 78.3 years for the period 2000–2005, which yields a comparable
estimate of µ = 4.77× 10−5/day.)
The data used for this case study came from official voter registration records and elec-
tion results from each state (see bibliography for sources). Voter registration records showing
Green Party registration totals, given in some states as often as monthly, were fit to the size
of the member class M over time. Since the dates for which Green Party registration data
were given varied from state to state, the initial and final times did as well, but covered
approximately the decade 1999–2008. Since voting data were given less often (in general in
November of even-numbered years) these data were used, where available, as initial condi-
tions V (0) +M(0). In other cases V (0) was estimated along with other model parameters
as discussed below. Table 5 gives the time periods modeled as well as the initial conditions
used. The size of each class is given as a percentage of the total target population (the
size of which is also given in the table). The rescaled Green Party registration data is also
shown in Figure 5. As can be seen in the graph, some states saw a noticeable change in the
Green Party’s trajectory following the November 2004 election, and so the data for these
states (DC, CA, OR, NY) was broken into two subseries (three in the case of DC, which also
underwent a visible change following the 2006 election), with different parameter estimates
for each subseries.
Data fitting used the program Berkeley Madonna 8.3 to obtain a least-squares fit to the
Green Party registration dataM(t) for the model parameters β−φ, αβ, ǫ, and γ, and, where
necessary, initial conditions. (β − φ and αβ were estimated directly, rather than α, β and φ
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Figure 5: Green Party registration data for the seven states (and district) used in the case
study, shown as percentages of the target population.
separately, in order to reduce the number of free parameters.) The estimation process was
iterated until the estimates were not on target interval boundaries, and this optimization
was carried out 10 times for each state (with different initial guesses) to obtain the best
possible fit. The resulting estimates are also given in Table 5. These estimates were then
used to determine the state of the system in each state by calculating reproduction numbers
and predicted end states (equilibria); results are shown in Table 6.
4.2 Results
As seen in Figure 5, the data indicate a clear period of growth for the Green Party in the
selected states during the first five years of the twenty-first century. However, for some states
(DC, CA, OR, NY) the data also show a visible decrease beginning at the end of 2004. The
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data indicate a clear change in the political landscape in these states following the November
2004 election, in which the positive trends the Green Party had been seeing in recent years
reversed, and voters left the Green Party, probably for the Democratic Party which saw gains
in the 2006 and 2008 elections. The DC Greens rallied in 2005 but experienced this same
trend reversal following the 2006 election. In each case, Table 5 suggests that the primary
reason for this change was a significant jump in the attention the target population paid to
the media and the activities of the two primary political parties, as evidenced by a marked
(orders of magnitude) increase in the value of the parameter ǫ (despite, in most cases, a
simultaneous increase in the net peer voter influence β − φ).
The other three states in this study (ME, MD, PA), on the other hand, have continued
to see healthy sustained growth in the Green Party over the past decade, although the
growth in Maine appears nearly meteoric compared to the slow building up in Maryland
and Pennsylvania. This difference is reflected in the much higher value of R1 for Maine (cf.
Table 6). The parameter estimates for Maine are much lower than for Maryland (cf. Table 5),
likely reflecting the lower overall person-to-person contact rate (Maine has no large urban
areas, whereas Maryland’s population is concentrated in them) as well as perhaps lower
sensitivity to others’ opinions, but the ratios reflected in the threshold quantities provide
fertile ground for the Green Party’s growth. Our one-track model predicts (Table 6) a slightly
higher equilibrium level of proportional participation in MD than in ME, but it will take
much longer to reach that end state (during which time political influences may change).
Pennsylvania, meanwhile, appears to be in a more unusual situation, as the parameter
estimates obtained from the data suggest the presence of a backward bifurcation as discussed
in Section 3: Here the tipping-point thresholds (R1, R2) do not appear to favor the long-term
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survival of the Green Party, but an initially large influx of Green voters would allow the party
to thrive, even enjoying majority status among the target voting population. The reason for
this phenomenon (also seen in the initial periods for DC) can be observed in the parameter
estimates, which show a low general sensitivity β − φ to the passive influence of community
peers, but a high sensitivity αβ to grassroots activists (relative to other PA parameters),
so that a sufficiently high core of party activists could sustain the party. Despite its initial
similarity to Maryland in terms of the proportional data illustrated in Figure 5, the growth
of the Pennsylvania Greens is indicated by the model to be part of a transient response—it is
just that, in this system, transient responses can last on the order of decades, during which
political influences can change significantly.
5 Analysis of the Two-Track Model
Having thoroughly examined and interpreted the one-track model, we now perform analysis
on the original, heterogeneous two-track model. Since the added complexity of this model
precludes a complete qualitative analysis, we shall make use of numerical analysis when
necessary to demonstrate behavior analogous to that exhibited by the simpler model.
First, we proportionalize the two-track model in the same way we did for the one-track
model to get:
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dh
dt
= pµ+ ǫHvH + φH(h + σl)vH − βH(vH + σvL + αm)h− µh, (21)
dl
dt
= (1− p)µ+ ǫLvL + φL(l + σh)vL − βL(σvH + vL + αm)l − µl, (22)
dvH
dt
= βH(vH + σvL + αm)h− ǫHvH − φH(h + σl)vH − γmvH − µvH , (23)
dvL
dt
= βL(σvH + vL + αm)l − ǫLvL − φL(l + σh)vL − γmvL − µvL, (24)
dm
dt
= γmvH + γmvL − µm. (25)
5.1 The Party-Free Equilibrium (PFE) and R′1
The two-track model, like the simpler version, includes a party-free equilibrium. Observing
that v∗H = v
∗
L = m
∗ = 0 satisfies dvH/dt = dvL/dt = dm/dt = 0, we substitute into
dh/dt = dl/dt = 0 to find the PFE; E1 is (p, 1− p, 0, 0, 0). The stability of E1 is again tied
to the first threshold quantity, which we shall denote R′1 (we shall use prime superscripts to
denote thresholds for the two-track model) and calculate using the next-generation operator
method (e.g., Castillo-Cha´vez, Feng and Huang, 2002), where vH , vL and m are considered
the infective classes:
R′1 =
1
2
[
rHH + rLL +
√
(rHH − rLL)2 + 4 rLH rHL
]
, (26)
where
rHH = p
βH − φH
µ+ ǫH + (1− p)σφH and rLL = (1− p)
βL − φL
µ+ ǫL + pσφL
,
respectively, are the high-affinity and low-affinity analogues of R1 (that is, the influence of
vH on h, and of vL on l), and
rLH = p
βHσ
µ+ ǫL + pσφL
and rHL = (1− p) βLσ
µ+ ǫH + (1− p)σφH
34
measure the cross-affinity influences (of vL on h and vH on l). See Appendix B for calcula-
tions.
R′1 can be interpreted as the average number of individuals converted into a third-party
voter (in either voting class) by an individual in vH or vL introduced into a population where
no one yet votes for the given party. The average is somewhat complicated, as it involves
four different contributing influences, each represented by one of the four r’s in (26). Each
of these component numbers has the same form as R1 for the one-track model (q.v.), but
measures of conversion of high-affinity voters are multiplied by a factor of p, the proportion
of the population which has a high affinity for the given party, while measures of conversion
of low-affinity voters are multiplied by the proportion 1 − p of low-affinity individuals. In
addition, cross-affinity influences are reduced by the factor σ. Note that in the extreme cases
p = 0 and p = 1 R′1 reduces to R1.
We can further interpret the expression for R′1 in political terms by observing that
max(rHH , rLL) < R
′
1 < max(rHH , rLL) +
√
rLH rHL (27)
(again see Appendix B for details). That is, R′1 is at least as great as each of the within-
track conversion efficiencies, and exceeds the maximum of the two (presumably rHH) by
less than the contribution of cross-track influences. This latter contribution is the geometric
mean of two terms representing a two-stage process, in which a voter in one track converts
an individual of the opposite affinity class into a third-party voter, who then influences an
individual in the first track to join the voting class of the original voter, thereby completing
the cycle. Because this cross-affinity cycle has two stages, the appropriate measure of its
efficiency is a geometric mean of the two individual stages. In the case that there is no cross-
35
affinity influence (σ = 0), the tracks decouple completely at this stage, and (27) reduces to
R′1 = max(rHH , rLL).
The PFE is locally stable when R′1 < 1, and unstable when R
′
1 > 1. In other words, each
third-party voter introduced into a population that includes high-affinity and low-affinity
individuals must influence, on average, more than one person to vote for the third party
during his/her voting lifetime, in order for the third-party voter classes to persist, with the
average defined by R′1.
5.2 The Member-Free Equilibrium (MFE) and R′2
The two-track model also has a second threshold parameter R′2. Analogous to R2 from the
one-track model, we define R′2 as the average number of third-party voters (VH and/or VL)
a member can convert into M if introduced into a population of them. Since R′2 is primarily
concerned with the transition from third-party voting to membership, we conveniently regard
M as the only infectious class, in order to apply the next-generation operator method to
determine this threshold. We then calculate, from (5) (or (25)):
∂
∂M
(
dM
dt
)
= γ(vH + vL)− µ;
since this is scalar we seek simply the positive part divided by the term that is subtracted
(departing M):
R′2 =
γ
µ
(v∗H2 + v
∗
L2) ,
where v∗H2 and v
∗
L2 are the equilibrium values at the MFE. This expression is analogous to
that for the one-track model,
R2 =
γ
µ
v∗ =
γ
µ
(
1− 1
R1
)
.
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Solving explicitly for the MFE of the two-track model is complicated, but we can show
enough to suggest that, as expected, it is unique and exists only for R′1 > 1. Since we have
m∗ = 0, any MFE must be an equilibrium of the subsystem
dvH
dt
=βH(vH + σvL)(p− vH)− φH(p− vH + σ(1− p− vL))vH − (µ+ ǫH)vH , (28)
dvL
dt
=βL(σvH + vL)(1− p− vL)− φL(1− p− vL + σ(p− vH))vL − (µ+ ǫL)vL, (29)
since we can now rewrite h = p − vH and l = 1 − p − vL. The two resulting equilibrium
conditions can be simplified to a single equation of degree 4, which admits up to 4 solutions.
One of these is the PFE, which can be factored out to leave a cubic equation for the MFE.
It can be shown that the constant term in this cubic equation is zero precisely when R′1 = 1,
so that the number of positive solutions changes by one when R′1 crosses 1.
In the special case that σ = 0 (no cross-affinity influence), the system (28)–(29) decouples,
yielding equilibria E1(0, 0), E2a(v˜
∗
H , 0), E2b(0, v˜
∗
L), and E2c(v˜
∗
H , v˜
∗
L), where
v˜∗H = p−
µ+ ǫH
βH − φH and v˜
∗
L = (1− p)−
µ+ ǫL
βL − φL
are meaningful only if positive, i.e., if rHH > 1 and rLL > 1, respectively. A straightforward
calculation of the Jacobian matrix shows that, within this subsystem,
• if R′1 < 1 (rHH < 1 and rLL < 1), the only equilibrium is E1, which is locally asymp-
totically stable (LAS);
• if rHH > 1 and rLL < 1, E1 is unstable but E2a is LAS;
• if rHH < 1 and rLL > 1, E1 is unstable but E2b is LAS;
• if rHH > 1 and rLL > 1, E1, E2a and E2b are all unstable but E2c is LAS.
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Regardless of the value of σ, it is straightforward to show that all solutions of (28)–(29)
which begin within [0, p]×[0, 1−p] remain within those bounds, by observing that dvH/dt < 0
when vH = p and 0 ≤ vL ≤ 1 − p, and that dvL/dt < 0 when vL = 1 − p and 0 ≤ vH ≤ p.
One can also exclude limit cycles from solutions of (28)–(29) under the assumptions that
βH > φH and βL > φL, via the usual application of Dulac’s Criterion:
∂
∂vH
(
1
vHvL
dvH
dt
)
< 0,
∂
∂vL
(
1
vHvL
dvL
dt
)
< 0.
We can therefore apply the Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem to conclude that the equilibria of
this system with σ = 0 identified above as locally stable, are in fact globally stable.
We can also differentiate the equilibrium conditions for (28)–(29) implicitly by σ to see
what happens as σ increases from zero: for instance,
∂vL
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=0
=
−βLv∗H(1− p− v∗L) + φLv∗L(p− v∗H)
(βL − φL)(1− p− 2v∗L)− (µ+ ǫL)
,
so
∂vL
∂σ
∣∣∣
E2a,σ=0
=
−βLv˜∗H(1− p)
(βL − φL)(1− p)− (µ+ ǫL) .
Thus when rHH > 1 and rLL > 1, the numerator is negative and the denominator is positive,
so that E2a exits the state space as σ increases from zero. A similar calculation holds for
E2b.
Since (28)–(29) is a subsystem of (21)–(25) (in whichm(t) ≡ 0), stability in the subsystem
does not imply stability in the full system, but instability in the subsystem does imply
instability in the full system. Thus the full system (21)–(25) has at most one stable MFE
when σ = 0 (and, by continuity using the above result of implicit differentiation, for σ
sufficiently small), that stability depending upon the additional dimension (m) not present
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in (28)–(29), as measured by R′2. While R
′
2 is not expressed explicitly, given the implicitness
of v∗H2 and v
∗
L2, the observed uniqueness of the MFE allows us to draw conclusions about
the two-track model numerically.
5.3 Survival Equilibria
Although the equilibrium conditions for (21)–(25) are too complicated to solve outright
(apart from the fact that v∗H + v
∗
L = µ/γ for any survival equilibrium, from (25)), we can
verify numerically not only their existence as expected when R′2 > 1, but also the existence,
under certain conditions, of a backward bifurcation at R′2 = 1 just as observed for the
one-track model.
Figure 6 shows a situation analogous to that depicted in Figure 4 for the one-track
model, in which survival equilibria may exist even below the PFE/MFE threshold (R2 = 0
or R′2 = 0); in Figure 7 the critical (minimum) value of R
′
2 is between 0 and 1. Both figures,
however, also demonstrate the existence of multiple locally stable survival equilibria near
R′2 = 1 (see the close-up in Figure 6), meaning that for some parameter values there are
two different levels at which the party may stabilize, in addition to the stable (for R′2 < 1)
extinction equilibria PFE/MFE. In these situations, the initial number of party members
plays a huge role in determining whether the party surges to major growth, languishes, or
dies out entirely.
Although the parameter values used to create these figures are idealized for illustration
purposes, the value p = 0.1 reflects an estimated 10% of the voting population having high
affinity for the Green Party’s agenda, and other values reflect the distinctions in peer-driven
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Figure 6: A bifurcation diagram for the two-track
model illustrating a backward bifurcation at R′2 = 1
(see closer view at right), multiple saddle-node bi-
furcations, and survival equilibria extending below
R′1 = 1 (R
′
2 = 0). Parameter values used are p = 0.1,
βL = 0.2, ǫH = 0.25, ǫL = 0.5, φH = φL = 0.1875,
α = 1.25, σ = 0.8, γ = 0.6, µ = 0.05; βH varies. All
rates are in years−1 (p, α, σ are dimensionless).
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Figure 7: A bifurcation diagram for
the two-track model illustrating a
backward bifurcation at R′2 = 1.
Parameter values used are p = 0.1,
βH = 10, βL = 0.2, ǫH = 0.25,
ǫL = 0.5, φH = φL = 0.1875,
α = 1.25, σ = 0.8, µ = 0.05; γ
varies. All rates are in years−1 (p,
α, σ are dimensionless).
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behavior described by the model for the two affinity classes. In addition, similar curves
can be obtained using a wide range of values for model parameters. Unfortunately, the
complexity of the two-track model prevents an explicit calculation of a quantity analogous
to R3 which measures the ability of the member class to recruit “susceptible” voters from
both affinity classes to become third-party voters. The same interpretation applies, however:
it is the work of party members in recruiting voters that enables a party to persist when
third-party voters’ influence is too weak.
6 Conclusion
The models described in this study investigate in mathematical terms the consequences of
our assumptions about the factors driving the growth and persistence of a third political
party arising through grassroots efforts. In particular, we assume a hierarchical structure in
which party members (activists) play a different, more extensive role in party survival than
party voters. We also assume that the dominant influences are primary contacts among
third-party voters and members and the general public, manifested in our models as nonlin-
ear terms involving the sizes of the two groups making contact. These nonlinearities govern
the behavior of the models—that is, the fate of the party under study—through threshold
quantities that describe the system’s tipping points. Our results should be taken as impli-
cations of the assumptions that such primary contacts, and not other factors (apart from
affinity as defined for our two-track model), drive individuals’ decisions whether to support
third political parties at any level.
The primary result of our analysis is that our models identify, and provide a way to
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measure, the three factors that determine the party’s survival. Each of these factors is a re-
productive number that describes the ability of a given class in the party structure to recruit
others. R1 and R
′
1 give the average number of unaffiliated voters recruited per third-party
voter, for the simplified and general model, respectively. This first threshold quantity mea-
sures the voting class’s ability to replace or sustain itself. R2 and R
′
2, meanwhile, describes
the efficiency with which third-party members convince third-party voters to become mem-
bers. This average number of new members recruited per existing member presupposes the
success of the first stage of recruitment: existing third-party voters recruiting new ones; that
is, R1 > 1, or else R2 < 0, which is meaningless except to indicate the failure of a recruitment
structure in which party members play no role in recruiting new voters. Finally, R3 quantifies
the ability of party members to recruit new voters directly from the unaffiliated (with this
party) public. The growth of the Green Party in states like Maine and Maryland, and its
recent decline in states like California and Oregon, illustrate the effect of these tipping-point
thresholds (cf. Gladwell, 2000).
The model’s prediction of survival states in scenarios where the primary, hierarchical
recruitment structure is not strong enough (R2 < 1, and even R1 < 1) to allow a party to
arise—that is, political trends are not favorable and the resulting influence of peer pressure
to vote for and support a given party is weak—explains the persistence of established third
parties during periods of adverse conditions, when political winds blow against them. In
particular, when party activists (members) are sufficiently capable of finding and recruiting
new voters directly (as measured by R3 > 1), a large enough core of committed party
members can ensure the party’s survival. In cases where the political environment was
favorable for a time (R2 > 1), this minimum core size is typically reached quickly. This
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reaching across traditional hierarchical structures (rather than party members interacting
primarily with those who already vote for the party) provides a robustness to the phenomenon
that manifests mathematically in the backward bifurcations illustrated in earlier sections.
Backward bifurcations also underscore the importance of initial conditions (having enough
initial party members) in enabling that robustness. This scenario is typified by the case
study of the Green Party in Pennsylvania.
Our general model classifies the general voting population by affinity to the ideas and
goals of a given third party. The form of the expression for R′1 illustrates how a party’s
ability to take hold in even a small subset of the population (the high-affinity track) affects
the party’s survival in the population as a whole: since R′1 is greater than either of the within-
track voting replacement numbers (analogous to R1), a successful enough recruitment within
the high-affinity track can maintain the party. Furthermore, the stratification into two tracks
creates the potential, as illustrated in Figures 6 and 7, for multiple stable survival states,
which facilitate party growth since the additional states require fewer initial members than
the original one. Our models could easily be extended to a stratification with intermediate
levels of affinity, each of which would make its own differential (R1-like) contribution to
determining the overall recruitment potential of a given third party (analogous to R′1), in
addition to increasing the diversity of possible survival states.
Even though we used available data to estimate parameters, we cannot claim to have mea-
sured the strength of the various influences directly. Our models provide qualitative measures
for the efficiency of parties’ recruitment strategies, identifying which factors interact, and
how. The accuracy of these measures hinges, of course, on the underlying assumptions ar-
ticulated in Section 2.1. Since it is often difficult in practice to quantify the strength of
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another’s opinions and arguments in influencing one’s opinion, our models can also be inter-
preted as an illustration of how individual interactions within a population combine to exert
a single collective influence observable only at the population level. Finally, it should be
noted that the deterministic nature of our models ignores the stochastic aspect of individual
interactions (such as an exceptionally charismatic individual): individual variability is a crit-
ical factor when considering very small groups. Here we have described political behavior in
terms of population averages, but the first stages of any movement are entirely dependent on
the particular personalities involved. Therefore our models should be considered as picking
up at the point where a grassroots movement has become sufficiently organized to become
a political force.
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A Equilibrium Analysis for the One-Track Model
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1: Existence of E3 and E4
We begin with the survival equilibrium condition f(m∗) = m∗2+BM∗+C = 0, where (from
(15))
B =
(
β − φ
αβ
)
µ
γ
−
(
1− µ
γ
)
+
µ
αβ
, C = −µ
γ
[
β − φ
αβ
(
1− µ
γ
)
− µ+ ǫ
αβ
]
.
We rewrite these expressions by defining the following terms:
q =
β − φ
αβ
, r =
µ
µ+ ǫ
, x =
αβ
µ+ ǫ
, y =
γ
µ
.
By assumption, β > φ, γ > µ, and α > 1, so that 0 < q < 1, 0 < r < 1, and y > 1. In these
terms, R1 = qx, R2 = y
(
1− 1
qx
)
, and
B =
1 + q
y
−
(
1− r
x
)
, C = −q
y
(
1− 1
y
− 1
qx
)
.
In order to be meaningful, solutions must fall within the interval (0, 1− v∗) (since m∗ >
1− v∗ will make s∗ = 1− v∗ −m∗ < 0). We calculate
f(1− v∗) = f
(
1− 1
y
)
=
r
x
+
1− r
xy
> 0
and
f ′(1− v∗) = 2(1− v∗) +B = 1− 1− q
y
+
r
x
> 0 (since 1− q < 1 < y).
These two inequalities imply that any roots of f lie to the left of 1 − v∗. Next note that
f(0) = C = − q
y2
(R2 − 1). Then when R2 > 1, f(0) < 0, so there is exactly one solution m∗+
in (0, 1 − v∗). When R2 < 1, f(0) > 0, so the number of solutions in (0, 1 − v∗) is even. In
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this case, both solutions m∗
±
are in (0, 1− v∗) precisely when B2− 4C ≥ 0 (the solutions are
real) and B < 0 (the parabola’s vertex m = −B/2 lies to the right of 0).
The condition B < 0 can be shown equivalent to x > r and y > yˆB ≡ (1 + q) xx−r . The
condition C > 0 (i.e., R2 < 1) can be shown equivalent to qx < 1 or y < yˆC ≡ qxqx−1 . The
condition B2 − 4C ≥ 0 becomes
(
1 + q
y
− x− r
x
)2
+ 4
q
y
(
1− 1
y
− 1
qx
)
≥ 0,
and multiplying by x2y2 we get
(x− r)2y2 − 2x [(1− q)(x− r) + 2(1− qr)] y + (1− q)2x2 ≥ 0.
Solving the quadratic inequality in y, this means y must not be between the two positive
roots
yˆ± ≡ x
(x− r)2
{
[(1− q)(x− r) + 2(1− qr)]± 2
√
(1− qr) [(1− q)(x− r) + (1− qr)]
}
.
Thus in order to have two survival equilibria, we must have x > r, yˆB < y < yˆC , and either
y ≤ yˆ− or y ≥ yˆ+.
In order to simplify these criteria, we compare the threshold values for y. We find that
yˆ− < yˆB < yˆ+ is equivalent (after substitution) to
−
√
(1− qr) [(1− q)(x− r) + (1− qr)] < qx− 1 <
√
(1− qr) [(1− q)(x− r) + (1− qr)],
(30)
or simply |qx− 1| < √(1− qr) [(1− q)(x− r) + (1− qr)]. Squaring both sides and simpli-
fying leads to the compound inequality
r < x < xˆ+ ≡ 1 + q(1− r)
q2
.
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Figure 8: Four threshold curves illustrating the survival equilibrium conditions
The lower bound r corresponds to the vertical asymptote in x shared by yˆ± and yˆB. Since
q < 1, 1
q
< 1
q2
< xˆ+, so at the upper bound qx − 1 > 0, and it is the second inequality in
(30) that is violated. That is, when x = xˆ+, yˆB = yˆ+. Thus it is always true that yˆ− < yˆB,
so the criterion y > yˆB allows us to discard the condition y ≤ yˆ− in favor of y ≥ yˆ+.
If we solve the inequality yˆB < yˆC for x (when qx > 1), we find again the condition
x < xˆ+, indicating that the graphs of yˆB, yˆC , and yˆ+ all cross at x = xˆ+. Further similar
computation can show that yˆ+ < yˆC except at x = xˆ+, where they are tangent. We thus
require r < x < xˆ+ and yˆ+ ≤ y < yˆC (the latter inequality only for qx > 1). A graph
illustrating all four curves is given in Figure 8.
To put the survival equilibrium conditions back in terms of the original parameters, we
see that r < x < xˆ+ becomes
µ
µ+ ǫ
<
αβ
µ+ ǫ
<
1 + β−φ
µ+ǫ
ǫ
µ+ǫ(
β−φ
µ+ǫ
)2 ;
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each of the inequalities can be solved for αβ/µ to make
αβ
µ
> max
(
1,
β − φ
µ+ ǫ
β − φ− ǫ
µ
)
.
Note that the last expression in the inequality above is the product of R1 and another
fraction whose value exceeds 1 precisely when R1 does. Thus if R1 < 1, the condition is
simply αβ
µ
> 1, while if R1 > 1 the condition is
αβ
µ
> R1(β − φ − ǫ)/µ. It is not so simple
to rewrite y > yˆ+; however, we can return to the original conditions B < 0, B
2 − 4C ≥ 0,
which can be rewritten more simply, either as R3a > 1, R3b > 1 as in the statement of
Proposition 1, or as:
B < 0⇔ 1
αβ
+
(
1 +
β − φ
αβ
)
1
γ
<
1
µ
, (31)
B2 − 4C ≥ 0⇔
√
1
αβ
+
√(
1− β − φ
αβ
)
1
γ
+ h(ǫ/γ) ≤
√
1
µ
, (32)
where
h(ǫ/γ) = 2
√
1
αβ
√
1
µ
(√
1 +
ǫ
γ
− 1
)
> 0.
In order to rewrite the condition B2 − 4C ≥ 0 in the form (32), we substitute B and C
from (15) and get:
[
µ
αβ
+
(
1 +
β − φ
αβ
)
µ
γ
− 1
]2
− 4µ
γ
[
µ+ ǫ
αβ
− β − φ
αβ
(
1− µ
γ
)]
≥ 0.
Expansion, summing like terms, and completing the square yields
[
µ
αβ
−
(
1− β − φ
αβ
)
µ
γ
+ 1
]2
≥ 4 µ
αβ
(
1 +
ǫ
γ
)
.
Next we take the square root of both sides,
∣∣∣∣ µαβ −
(
1− β − φ
αβ
)
µ
γ
+ 1
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2
√
µ
αβ
(
1 +
ǫ
γ
)
.
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Since we require µ < γ and β > φ, then
µ
αβ
−
(
1− β − φ
αβ
)
µ
γ
+ 1 =
µ
αβ
+
β − φ
αβ
µ
γ
+
(
1− µ
γ
)
> 0,
so we can drop the absolute value bars. Finally, rearranging, we get
(
1− β − φ
αβ
)
1
γ
≤ 1
µ
− 2
√
1
αβ
1
µ
(
1 +
ǫ
γ
)
+
1
αβ
.
In the case that ǫ = 0, this inequality can be further simplified by factoring the right-hand
side as a perfect square, taking the square root of both sides, and using the fact that (31)
implies 1/αβ < 1/µ, to get
√
1
αβ
+
√(
1− β − φ
αβ
)
1
γ
≤
√
1
µ
.
We can apply the same technique to obtain (32).
A.2 Stability Analysis for E3
From the end of Section 3.3, it remains to show that tr J1(E3) < 0 when R2 ≥ 2. This
condition on the trace is equivalent to
m∗+ > L ≡
(β − φ)
(
1− 2µ
γ
)
− (µ+ ǫ)
(β − φ+ αβ + γ) .
In terms of q, r, x and y as defined in the previous section,
L =
q
(
1− 1
qx
− 2
y
)
(
1 + q + yr
x
) , B =
(
1 + q + yr
x
)
y
− 1, C = −q
y
(
1− 1
qx
− 1
y
)
.
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Now the stability condition is
m∗+ =
1
2
[
−B +
√
B2 − 4C
]
> L
√
B2 − 4C > B + 2L
B + 2L < 0, or B + 2L > 0 and B2 − 4C > B2 + 4BL+ 4L2
B + 2L > 0 ⇒ −C > BL+ L2
B + 2L > 0 ⇒ q
y
(
1− 1
qx
− 1
y
)
>
q
y
(
1− 1
qx
− 2
y
)
− L+ L2
B + 2L > 0 ⇒ 0 > − q
y2
− L+ L2
Here we multiply by − (1 + q + yr
x
)2
/q, expand, and simplify to get
0 <
(
1 + q
y
+
r
x
)2
+
(
1− 1
qx
− 2
y
)(
1 +
1 + yr
x
+
2q
y
)
,
which is true since
R2 ≥ 2⇔
(
1− 1
qx
− 2
y
)
≥ 0.
This completes the verification that E3 is LAS when it exists.
B R′1 for the Two-Track Model
We calculate the reproductive number R′1 of the two-track model using the next-generation
operator method where R′1 is analogous to R1 of the one-track model. The party-free equi-
librium E1 of (21)–(25) is (p, (1 − p), 0, 0, 0). Differentiating (23)–(25) with respect to the
“infective” variables vH , vL, and m, and substituting the PFE values yields the following
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“mini-Jacobian” matrix:
A =


(βH − φH)p− wH βHσp αβHp
βLσ(1− p) (βL − φL)(1− p)− wL αβL(1− p)
0 0 −µ


,
where wH = µ + ǫH + φHσ(1 − p) and wL = µ + ǫL + φLσp. We next rewrite A = M˜ − D˜,
where the entries of M˜ are nonnegative and D˜ is a diagonal matrix:
M˜ =


(βH − φH)p βHσp αβHp
βLσ(1− p) (βL − φL)(1− p) αβL(1− p)
0 0 0


and
D =


µ+ ǫH + φHσ(1− p) 0 0
0 µ+ ǫL + φLσp 0
0 0 µ


Now R′1 is the dominant (largest) eigenvalue of
MD−1 =


(βH−φH)p
µ+ǫH+φHσ(1−p)
βHσp
µ+ǫL+φLσp
αβHp/µ
βLσ(1−p)
µ+ǫH+φHσ(1−p)
(βL−φL)(1−p)
µ+ǫL+φLσp
αβL(1− p)/µ
0 0 0


=


rHH rLH αβHp/µ
rHL rLL αβHp/µ
0 0 0


.
The three eigenvalues are 0 and
1
2
[
rHH + rLL ±
√
(rHH − rLL)2 + 4rHL rLH
]
;
R′1 takes the positive square root in the latter expression. By inspection we can see that for
the extreme cases p = 0 and p = 1, R′1 simplifies to R1 for the one-track model.
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Since the second term inside the radical is positive, we have that
R′1 >
1
2
[
rHH + rLL +
√
(rHH − rLL)2
]
=
1
2
[rHH + rLL + |rHH − rLL|] = max(rHH , rLL).
Since, for positive numbers a and b,
√
a+ b <
√
a+
√
b, we also have that
R′1 <
1
2
[
rHH + rLL +
√
(rHH − rLL)2 + 2√rHL rLH
]
= max(rHH , rLL) +
√
rHL rLH .
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Table 1: Compartments and parameters of the two-track model
Table of Compartments and Parameters
H high affinity susceptibles (i.e., voters highly susceptible to third party ideology)
L low affinity susceptibles (i.e., voters barely susceptible to third party ideology)
VH third party voting individuals deriving from H
VL third party voter individuals deriving from S
M third party members (i.e., party officials, donors, volunteers)
p proportion of the voting population N entering H
βH peer-driven recruitment rate of H into VH by individuals in VH , VL and M
ǫH linear recruitment rate of VH back into H via secondary contacts
(i.e., media and campaigning from opposing parties)
φH recruitment rate of VH into H by direct contact with individuals
in the opposition classes (i.e., individuals in H and L)
βL peer driven recruitment rate of L into VL by individuals in VL, VH , and M
ǫL linear recruitment rate of VL back into L via secondary contacts
(i.e., media and campaigning from opposing parties)
φL recruitment rate of VL into L by direct contact with individuals
in the opposition classes (i.e., individuals in H and L)
α factor by which the influence of party members M in recruiting voters
in H and L into VH and VL exceeds that of voters in VH and VL
σ factor by which the influence of individuals upon members of a different
affinity class is reduced in encouraging or discouraging third party voting
γ recruitment rate of VH and VL into M by individuals in M
µ rate at which individuals enter or leave the voting system
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Table 2: Parameters of the one-track model
β peer driven recruitment rate of S into V by third party voters and members
ǫ recruitment rate of V back into S via secondary contacts
(i.e., media and campaigning from opposing parties)
φ recruitment rate of V into S by direct contact with susceptibles
α factor by which the recruitment rate of S into V by third party
members exceeds the recruitment rate by individuals in V
γ recruitment rate of V into M by third party members
µ rate at which individuals enter or leave the voting system
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Table 3: Equilibria of one-track model
Equilibrium Existence Cond. Stability Cond.
Party-Free E1 = (1, 0, 0) always exists R1 < 1
Member-Free E2 = (
1
R1
, 1− 1
R1
, 0) R1 > 1 R2 < 1
Survival E3 = (1− µγ −m∗+, µγ , m∗+) (i) R2 > 1, or always stable
(ii) R2 < 1, R3 > 1 when it exists
Survival E4 = (1− µγ −m∗−, µγ , m∗−) R2 < 1, R3 > 1 always unstable
Table 4: Regions of Equilibrium Stability
E1 E2 E3 E4
I stable unstable does not exist does not exist
II unstable stable does not exist does not exist
III unstable unstable stable does not exist
IV unstable stable stable unstable
V stable does not exist stable unstable
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Table 5: Estimated model parameters, for the seven U.S. states (and district) used in the
case study. States are listed in decreasing order of proportional membership M to facilitate
comparison with Figure 5. Initial conditions v(0) marked with asterisks *, as well as all
model parameters (except µ), were estimated by data fitting as described in the main text.
All rates are given in units of 1/days; values below 0.01 are given in scientific notation.
Initial Final Initial Conditions
State time time (S(0), V (0),M(0)) β − φ αβ ǫ γ
ME Jun 1998 Nov 2006 (91.12, 8.58, 0.31) 5.27E–4 0.5022 1.00E–5 1.34E–4
DC Jun 2003 Sep 2004 (87.54, 8.61, 3.85) 0.0181 1.9911 1.02 6.72E–4
Jul 2005 Aug 2006 (79.52, 16.43*, 4.05) 1.06E–3 0.200 0.468 0.0115
Jan 2007 Nov 2008 (89.04, 6.63*, 4.33) 1.66E–3 1.15 2.83 1.02E–7
CA Feb 1999 Feb 2004 (94.87, 3.09, 2.03) 4.94E–4 0.7188 1.69E–5 3.73E–4
Oct 2004 May 2008 (91.87, 4.80*, 3.32) 0.0105 0.2193 0.162 1.94E–6
OR Jan 2001 Oct 2004 (88.45, 10.26, 1.29) 1.56E–4 1.45 2.99E–5 1.29E–4
Nov 2004 Mar 2009 (96.06, 1.70*, 2.23) 0.0524 0.781 2.93 1.00E–6
NY Apr 1999 Mar 2004 (99.27, 0.73, 0.01) 0.0119 0.352 4.00E–3 4.33E–4
Nov 2004 Mar 2008 (98.65, 0.16*, 1.19) 0.0567 0.283 3.54 1.00E–6
MD Aug 2000 Mar 2009 (98.17, 1.32, 0.01) 0.0103 1.03 2.40E–3 1.93E–4
PA Apr 2001 Nov 2006 (97.33, 2.55, 0.11) 1.01E–5 0.329 1.37E–6 9.85E–4
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Table 6: Reproductive numbers and stable equilibria for the one-track model, calculated
using parameter estimates from Table 5. Reproductive numbers not given are negative.
Equilibria are given as percentages of the target population.
State Period R1 R2 R3 Stable equilibria (v
∗, m∗)
ME 1998–2006 9.44 2.62 43.5 E3 = (34.15, 65.84)
DC 2003–2004 0.18 − 72.4 E1 = (0, 0), E3 = (6.81, 89.30)
2005–2006 0.0023 − 38.9 E1 = (0, 0), E3 = (0.39, 98.63)
2007–2008 0.00059 − − E1 = (0, 0)
CA 1999–2004 7.88 7.11 81.3 E3 = (12.28, 87.71)
2004–2008 0.065 − − E1 = (0, 0)
OR 2001–2004 2.06 1.45 71.8 E3 = (35.40, 64.59)
2004–2009 0.018 − − E1 = (0, 0)
NY 1999–2004 2.93 6.23 53.4 E3 = (10.58, 89.27)
2004–2008 0.016 − − E1 = (0, 0)
MD 2000–2009 4.20 3.21 72.1 E3 = (23.76, 76.16)
PA 2001–2006 0.21 − 64.8 E1 = (0, 0), E3 = (4.84, 95.14)
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